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Pakistan-based terrorist organisation (PAFF)

HomePakistan-based terrorist organisation (PAFF)

Advance Terror Intelligence Ignored: A Case of Institutional Failure in National Security Response

Overview

Helpful Foundation places on public record a grave national security concern involving advance intelligence warnings shared with the Government of India regarding a Pakistan-based terrorist organisation (PAFF) and the subsequent failure of institutional response, despite timely and documented alerts.

This matter raises serious questions about information handling, inter-agency coordination, and accountability in matters involving national security.

Background: Advance Intelligence Submission

On 19 September 2023, Helpful Foundation formally submitted confidential intelligence inputs to:

  • Prime Minister’s Office (PMO)
  • Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA)
  • National Security Advisor
  • Directorate of Military Intelligence

The submission warned of planned terror attacks in Jammu & Kashmir, particularly in November 2023, with reference to PAFF (People’s Anti-Fascist Front), a Pakistan-based terror outfit.

The communication was marked “CONFIDENTIAL – MOST IMMEDIATE / URGENT” and included:

  • Locations of PAFF group activation (Poonch, Kargil, Ladakh)
  • Modus operandi and infiltration routes
  • Prior attack indicators
  • Likelihood of a high-impact suicide attack in J&K
  • Funding and logistical channels

(Referenced in the PAFF intelligence dossier) PAFF

Subsequent Terror Incident

Despite this advance warning, a terror attack occurred in Rajouri district, J&K on 22 November 2023, resulting in the loss of lives, including security personnel.

This incident occurred within the timeframe and geographic risk zone highlighted in the confidential alert.

Helpful Foundation asserts that preventive action was possible had the intelligence been acted upon with due seriousness.

RTI Disclosure and Institutional Response

Following the incident, Helpful Foundation filed an RTI seeking clarification on what action the PMO took on the submitted intelligence.

The response from the Central Public Information Officer (CPIO), PMO, stated that:

The information was treated as “assumption-based” and a “roving enquiry” and did not qualify as information under Section 2(f) of the RTI Act.

This reply strongly indicates that the intelligence was not forwarded to or processed by relevant security agencies.

Formal Grievance to the Prime Minister’s Office

In response, Helpful Foundation filed a formal grievance (Registration No. PMOPG/E/2023/0257614) alleging:

  • Negligence in handling national security intelligence
  • Failure to act on advance terror inputs
  • Lack of accountability of responsible officers

The grievance explicitly states that timely action could have prevented casualties.

Status update shows that the matter was later forwarded to the Jammu & Kashmir Division, Ministry of Home Affairs, after closure at the PMO level .

Core Issues Raised

This case highlights systemic concerns:

  1. Breakdown in Intelligence Escalation
    • No evidence of structured forwarding to operational agencies.
  2. Lack of Accountability
    • No internal inquiry disclosed regarding handling of sensitive inputs.
  3. RTI Evasion in National Security Context
    • Intelligence dismissed without documented evaluation.
  4. Institutional Silence Post-Incident
    • Action only taken after public grievance, not proactively.

Why This Matters

National security intelligence, especially when submitted in advance and in writing, demands:

  • Immediate evaluation
  • Multi-agency circulation
  • Documented decision-making
  • Clear responsibility assignment

Failure at any stage places citizens, security forces, and the nation at risk.

Helpful Foundation’s Position

Helpful Foundation reiterates that:

  • It acted in good faith and in the national interest
  • It followed lawful and official channels
  • It seeks accountability, not confrontation
  • It demands systemic correction, not symbolic closure

Call for Accountability and Reform

Helpful Foundation urges:

  • An independent inquiry into handling of advance terror intelligence
  • Clear Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for NGO and citizen-provided intelligence
  • Defined officer-level responsibility in sensitive information processing
  • Parliamentary and public oversight where institutional silence prevails

National security cannot depend on assumptions.
Every ignored warning has a human cost.

PAFF (People’s Anti-Fascist Front)

1. Identification of PAFF

  • PAFF (People’s Anti-Fascist Front) is identified as a Pakistan-based terrorist organisation.
  • PAFF was established in 2020.
  • It originated as an offshoot/formation linked to:
    • Jaish-e-Mohammad
    • Al-Badar 313
  • These are recognised Pakistan-based jihadist groups.

2. Operational Presence & Activation in India

As per intelligence inputs submitted by Helpful Foundation:

  • March 2023
    • First PAFF group reported active in Poonch, Jammu & Kashmir.
  • July 2023
    • Second PAFF group infiltrated into Ladakh.
  • First week of August 2023
    • Second PAFF group became active in Kargil.
    • The group associated with local Mujahideen elements.

3. Planned & Executed Attacks (As Reported)

Reported Attack Incidents

  1. Blast at a scrap dealer’s shop, Kargil
    • Date: 18 September 2023
  2. Anantnag terror attack
    • Date: 16 September 2023

Planned Attack Warning

  • Intelligence warned that:
    • The third and most significant PAFF attack was planned before the last week of November 2023.
    • The intended nature was a human suicide attack in Jammu & Kashmir.
    • The attack pattern was compared to:
      • Pulwama attack
      • 2016 Pathankot attack

4. November 2023 Terror Incident Reference

  • Helpful Foundation submitted advance warnings that PAFF planned attacks in November 2023.
  • A terror attack occurred on 22 November 2023 in Rajouri district, J&K.
  • The grievance records state that:
    • The attack occurred within the warned timeframe.
    • Preventive action could have been taken had the intelligence been acted upon.

5. Group Structure & Attack Method

  • Each PAFF operational group consists of approximately 10 members.
  • Groups are divided into two teams:
    1. Offensive team
    2. Defensive/support team
  • PAFF reportedly:
    • Chooses open areas for attacks.
    • Coordinates closely with Pakistan-based Mujahideen elements.
    • Primarily targets Indian Army and security forces.

6. Recruitment & Membership

  • Individuals joining PAFF are reported to include:
    • Pakistani smugglers from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK).
    • Tribal groups such as:
      • Afridi
      • Gakhhar
      • Kakar
      • Mehar
  • Majority recruitment interest comes from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa region.

7. Weapons & Logistics

  • PAFF is reported to use:
    • US Army weapons left behind in Afghanistan after the US withdrawal.
  • These weapons are routed into India through illegal channels.

8. Funding & Income Sources

PAFF funding sources reported include:

  • Donations from:
    • Canada
    • United Kingdom
    • Turkey
  • Primary income source:
    • Drug smuggling
    • Illegal arms supply into India
  • Estimated annual turnover of drug-related operations:
    • ₹8,000 – ₹15,000 crore within India

9. Smuggling Routes & Entry Points

  • Key logistical routes mentioned:
    • Mundra Port, Gujarat – bulk drug consignments
    • Illegal arms routed into Punjab, India
  • Gujarat and Punjab identified as:
    • Major supply corridors for illegal arms and drugs across India

10. External Support & Involvement

  • All reported terror planning attributed to:
    • ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence), Pakistan
  • PAFF leadership reportedly operates from Lahore, Pakistan.
  • Reference made to:
    • Maulana Masood Azhar
    • His reported presence in Afghanistan under Taliban protection, supported by ISI.

11. Allegations of Institutional Complicity

  • Documents allege that:
    • Some personnel from:
      • BSF
      • Local Police
      • Coastal Guard
      • Customs
    • May have supported smuggling networks linked to Pakistan-based terror groups.
  • Allegations also mention political shielding of smuggling operations.

12. Recommendations to Counter PAFF (As Submitted)

Suggested measures include:

  • Strict action against smugglers
  • Vehicle checks from Gujarat, Rajasthan, and Punjab
  • Monitoring of consignments from UK & Canada at Mundra Port
  • Enhanced oversight of coastal and border enforcement agencies
  • Expanded operational role for NIA in affected states
  • Independent reporting teams for national security monitoring
j&K Grievance StatusDownload