By Helpful Foundation
India today faces a national security environment defined not only by military confrontation, but by covert influence operations, intelligence penetration through indirect platforms, strategic narrative control, economic leverage, and technology-driven vulnerabilities.
These risks operate quietly and systematically—often under the appearance of legitimate academic cooperation, think-tank dialogue, cultural exchange, and policy interaction. When such engagements occur without adequate institutional oversight, they can evolve into channels of intelligence collection and long-term strategic influence.
1. Chinese Study Centres in India: Documented Strategic Concerns
A major area of concern is the expansion of Chinese Study Centres and China-focused research platforms operating within India.
Publicly Declared Objectives:
- Promotion of Chinese language, history, culture, and arts
- Academic research on Chinese society, economy, and politics
- Scholarly exchange and policy dialogue
Security Risk Identified:
Evidence indicates that several such centres have direct or indirect linkages with Chinese state organs, including the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Ministry of State Security (MSS).
These centres enable structured access to:
- Serving and retired Indian civil servants
- Defence and strategic experts
- Academics and policy researchers
Over time, such access allows profiling, pattern analysis, and information harvesting, which are core intelligence objectives.
2. Intelligence-Linked Chinese Think Tanks
One prominent institution repeatedly referenced in available material is the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), which is widely acknowledged to be affiliated with China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS).
Areas of Research:
- India–China strategic relations
- Military and defence policy
- Taiwan, Hong Kong, South China Sea
- Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
CICIR’s work feeds directly into Chinese state policy formulation, raising concerns when its outreach intersects with Indian officials and experts.
3. BRICS Think Tank Engagements and Pakistan Intelligence Interface
A particularly sensitive issue arises from documented meetings between Chinese think tank delegations and senior figures of Pakistan’s intelligence establishment.
January 2019 – Islamabad Meeting
A delegation of the China Council for BRICS Think Tank Cooperation (CCBTC) met with Zaheer‑ul‑Islam, former Director General of the Inter‑Services Intelligence (ISI).
Chinese Participants Included:
- Liu Jianzhang – Secretary General, China Council for BRICS Think Tank Cooperation
- Gao Yuanyuan – Interpreter, CCBTC
- Dong Weijun – Deputy Director, China Council for BRICS Think Tank Cooperation
Officials Linked to the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China, Islamabad:
- Zhao Zhiyong – Director of Political & Press Section
- Marko Chen – Embassy official
Strategic Concern:
Such interactions raise credible risks of:
- Intelligence ecosystem coordination
- Strategic narrative alignment between China and Pakistan
- Indirect exposure of Indian strategic thinking through third-country platforms
4. Participation of Retired Indian Officials: Vulnerability Assessment
The material provided records the presence of retired Indian officers at meetings and events involving Chinese think tanks and BRICS forums, including:
- Major General Syed Khalid Amir Jaffery (Retd.)
- Major General Ahmed Mohd Amir (Retd.)
- Brigadier Akbar Nawaz Jorad (Retd.)
- Lieutenant Colonel Khalid Tahir Akram (Retd.)
While retired officials are entitled to engage in public discourse, informal or repeated interaction with foreign intelligence-linked platforms poses risks of:
- Unintentional disclosure
- Strategic pattern analysis
- Profiling of India’s defence and intelligence outlook
5. RTI Findings: Institutional Awareness Gaps
Multiple Right to Information (RTI) applications were filed with:
- President’s Secretariat
- Ministry of Home Affairs
- Other central departments
RTI Responses Indicated:
- No consolidated data on Chinese Study Centres
- No formal record of intelligence-linked academic platforms
This reflects a serious institutional blind spot, where non-traditional security threats remain outside formal monitoring frameworks.
6. Pakistan as a Strategic Convergence Zone
Pakistan emerges as a high-risk node for convergence of Chinese military, economic, and intelligence interests.
Exposure Areas:
- Military: joint training, equipment, intelligence sharing
- Economy: CPEC, ports, energy, infrastructure leverage
- Media: Belt & Road narrative networks
- Academia: scholarships, research funding, conferences
- Technology: telecom, surveillance, data infrastructure
7. Information Warfare and Narrative Conditioning
Influence operations today rely less on propaganda and more on long-term narrative conditioning, achieved through:
- Conferences and seminars
- Research publications
- Media commentary
- Academic endorsements
In an open democracy, such influence can gradually reshape policy debates without visible coercion.
8. China’s Strategic Doctrine and Military-Civil Fusion
China’s declared doctrine includes:
- “National rejuvenation” by 2049
- Expansion of comprehensive national power
- Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) integrating civilian research, technology, logistics, and academia into military capability
Under this framework, civilian platforms cannot automatically be treated as neutral.
Conclusion: Strategic Vigilance Is a National Imperative
India’s national security challenge is systemic and multidimensional. It demands:
- Preventive counter-intelligence awareness
- Regulatory clarity for foreign-linked institutions
- Inter-agency coordination
- Transparent and lawful oversight
Helpful Foundation remains committed to responsible research, constitutional advocacy, and national interest protection.
National security today is secured through vigilance, not reaction.